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Features

Components​

Physical hardware devices facilitate numerous capabilities in addition to base usage of the ZKNetwork.

dAppStore​

Decentralized App Store for easy access and management of different applications that are native to, and compatible with, the ZKN's decentralized mixnets and private application layer.

Transparent "Smart" Proxy​

Auto-route data to different mix networks and network segments according to rules as not all traffic requires the same level of network characteristics including privacy.

Secure Distribution Pipeline​

Merkle Tree root hashed software distributions. Nodes only run authenticated-trusted wares. DAØ governs authorized publishers (Merkle Tree contents for private verification) of software, firmware, and hardware -- the full stack of manufacturing and distribution to guarantee secure trusted execution within decentralized context.

Private Authenticity​

Using ZKProofs, hardware-based crypto-key storage, and a DAØ-governed manufacturing supply chain, physical devices may prove their authenticity and other characteristics without revealing any information specific to the device or its operator(s). This facilitates a number of features within the ZKNetwork including but not limited to:

  • incentive rewards
  • anti-counterfeit measures
  • decentralized manufacturing
  • private access to authorized resources

Figure 1: Merkle Map Key hashed data format for ZK Proofs.

Figure 2: Merkle Tree as a collection of Unique Device Identifiers

R&D Outline
  • as managed by the DAO, multi-sig collective process for managing MT
    • to bridge the centralized nature of physical product manufacturing with decentralized essence of ZKNetwork
    • a MerkleMap shall be maintained as a mapping of authorized mfrs to their mfr'd node units
      • recursively maintained MM of UUIDs to Merkle Tree Root for distributor
      • each distributor maintains their own Merkle Tree
        • that contains official hardware-based serial numbers
        • corresponding to individual node units
    • in this manner, a physical node (and thus owner and corresponding wallet holder)
      • can zk-prove ownership of an authentic (non-counterfeit) device
        • without revealing
          • which mfr
          • which device specifically
      • mfrs can zk-prove
        • device of their creation is online and in commission
    • consider: way to reveal particular hw id if bad actor, zk-blacklist
  • as combined with hw-based tamper-resistance, it can be zk-proven that a node's physical perimeter has not been compromised
    • if also able to access "id" of OS/warez, then zkp of trusted exe env?
  • potential issues:
    • like mining, mfrs running the nodes themselves?
      • check for unique IP addresses
      • incentive for unique node on unique IP address
  • extend concept to:
    • mix-net powered IoT/DePIN devices
      • special: privacy & security
    • supply chain security